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International Law and International 
Relations- Bahrain Polytechnic- Kingdom 
of Bahrain 
 Abstract: 
On May 2, 2011, a covert operation – codenamed Operation Trip to Atlantic 
City – led to the death of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Certain observers 
justified the raid as follows: as bin Laden continued to pose an imminent threat 
to the United States, and as Pakistan was unable or unwilling to prevent Al-
Qaida from using its territory as a base for launching attacks, the United States 
was authorized to use military force in self-defense against bin Laden in the 
sovereign territory of Pakistan. This article’s purpose is to assess the validity in 
law of such a justification through the analysis of scholarly schools of thought, 
State practice and decisions of the International Court of Justice. Given that 
self-defense can be invoked only in the case of ongoing armed attack by a State 
– an opinion confirmed by the Court – this article demonstrates that the 
conditions of invocation and implementation of the right of self-defense were 
not fulfilled in casu for at least two reasons. Firstly, after analyzing the 
‘unwilling and unable’ test as well as the theory of complicity in light of the 
rules of attribution for responsibility of States for internationally wrongful act, it 
is concluded that the threatening activities of Al-Qaida could not be attributed to 
Pakistan. Secondly, after identifying the legal purpose of the right of self-
defense and analyzing the requirement of immediacy, it is concluded that no 
military operation in the name of self-defense can be lawfully carried out in 
anticipation of an attack and, in particular, to address an imminent threat. 
Introduction 
In the early hours of May 2, 2011, a commando of the very efficient US 
Navy Special Forces – the Navy SEALs – conducted a covert operation. This 
was often referred to in code as ‘The Trip to Atlantic City’ which subsequently 
led to the death of Osama bin Laden, the head of Al-Qaida
(1)
. Bin Laden was 
hidden in a compound in Abbottābād, a Pakistani city located approximately 
fifty kilometers north of Islamabad. The US Government justified the operation 
                                      
(1) Regarding the preparation of this operation, see notably Siobhan Gorman, Julian E. Barnes, ‘Spy, 
Military Ties Aided bin Laden Raid’, The Wall Street Journal, May 23rd, 2011. 
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through the right of self-defense. Indeed, standing before the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. declared on May 4
th
 that 
“[the killing of bin Laden] was justified as an act of national self-defense”
(2)
. 
Although the legal reasoning for the invocation of the right of self-defense in 
the case of the bin Laden operation was not clearly detailed and officially 
expressed, some legal and former legal advisors for the American 
Administration provided – sometimes on a personal level – certain statements, 
observations or speculations as to the position of the Obama Administration on 
the matter. In our opinion, these observations were probably not so distant from 
what could be a more official standpoint. Thus, on May 19
th
, the State 
Department Legal Adviser Harold H. Koh stated in the forum of discussion 
Opinio Juris: “[…] bin Laden continued to pose an imminent threat to the 
United States that engaged our right to use force, a threat that materials seized 
during the raid have only further documented”
(3)
. Then, on the same day and in 
the same forum of discussion, Marty Lederman
(4)
 stated: “Under the relevant 
sovereignty rules, it is generally the case (this is simplifying a bit) that even 
where international law warrants Nation A’s use of force against non-state 
actors in self-defense and/or in an armed conflict, Nation A cannot use such 
force against such targets in the sovereign territory of State B unless State B 
either consents to such use of force, or State B is unable or unwilling to interdict 
the threat itself.”
(5)
 Marty Lederman also quoted John B. Bellinger who stated in 
2006 when he was State Legal Adviser: “As a practical matter, though, a state 
must be responsible for preventing terrorists from using its territory as a base for 
launching attacks. And, as a legal matter, where a state is unwilling or unable to 
do so, it may be lawful for the targeted state to use military force in self-defense 
to address that threat.”
(6)
 
After having rejected the assumption that Pakistan would have consented ex 
                                      
(2) Statement of the Attorney General, Eric H. Holder Jr., before the United States Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, at a hearing entitled ‘Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice’, May 4th, 2011, available 
at http://judiciary.authoring.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm. See also the statement of the spokesperson of 
the White House, dated May 4th, 2011, ‘We acted in the nation’s self-defense’, Office of the Press 
Secretary, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/05/04/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-542011. 
(3) See Harold H. Koh in the forum Opinio Juris, under the post ‘The Lawfulness of the U.S. Operation 
Against Osama bin Laden’, May 19th, 2011, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-
of-the-us-operation-against-osama-bin-laden. 
(4) Marty Lederman was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal 
Counsel from 2009 to 2010 and Attorney Advisor in the Office of Legal Counsel from 1994 to 2002. 
(5) See Marty Lederman in the forum Opinio Juris, under the post ‘The U.S. Perspective on the Legal 
Basis for the bin Laden Operation’, May 19th, 2011, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/24/the-us-
perspective-on-the-legal-basis-for-the-bin-laden-operation/. 
(6) See John B. Bellinger, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism, conference given at the London School of 
Economics, October 31st, 2006, available at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/PublicEvents/pdf/20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf. 
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ante facto to an American intervention – and the Pakistani authorities did deny 
having been informed of the American operation
(7)
 – Marty Lederman briefly 
applied the “unwilling or unable” test
(8)
 to the present case, a doctrine moreover 
invoked on several occasions by President Obama
(9)
. Merely speculating as to 
the Administration’s views, Lederman declared that it is possible that for the 
Obama Administration “Pakistan was effectively ‘unable’ to ameliorate the 
threat from bin Laden, in the sense that tipping off the Pakistani officials would 
have posed a significant risk of compromising any prospect of incapacitating 
him”
(10)
. CIA Chief Leon Panetta indeed affirmed on May 3
rd
 that it had been 
decided not to inform Pakistan of the operation because “any effort to work with 
Pakistanis could jeopardize the mission. They might alert the targets.”
(11)
 It is 
worth mentioning – and it is not surprising – that the Government of Pakistan 
rejected such statements. On May 9
th
, Prime Minister Gilani notably stated: 
“Allegations of complicity or incompetence are absurd. We emphatically reject 
                                      
(7) See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, Death of Osama bin Ladin - Respect for Pakistan's 
Established Policy Parameters on Counter Terrorism, May 3rd, 2011, available at 
http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2011/May/PR_152.htm. 
(8) On the ‘unwilling or unable test’, see the interesting contribution of Ashley S. Deeks, ‘’Unwilling or 
Unable’: Toward a normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense’, Va.J. Int’l L., vol. 52, 2011-
2012, pp. 483-550. 
(9) The spokesperson of the White House pointed out that “the President, even before he was President, 
when he was a candidate, had a very clear idea about the approach he would take as President towards 
Osama bin Laden. In August of 2007, he said, ‘If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist 
targets and President Musharraf won't act, we will.’ In July of 2008, he said, ‘We must make it clear that if 
Pakistan cannot or will not act, we will take out high-level terrorist targets like bin Laden if we have them 
in our sights.’ And he repeated statements like that.” Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Press 
Secretary Jay Carney and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John 
Brennan, May, 2nd 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/press-
briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-and-assistant-president-homela.  
(10) Marty Lederman, supra note 5. See also Ashley S. Deeks, ‘Pakistan's Sovereignty and the Killing of 
Osama Bin Laden’, ASIL Insights, May 5th, 2011, available at http://www.asil.org/insights110505.cfm: 
“Based on the facts that have come to light to date, the United States appears to have strong arguments that 
Pakistan was unwilling or unable to strike against Bin Laden. Most importantly, the United States has a 
reasonable argument that asking the Government of Pakistan to act against Bin Laden could have 
undermined the mission. The size and location of the compound and its proximity to Pakistani military 
installations has cast strong doubt on Pakistan’s commitment to defeat al Qaeda.” 
(11) See Massimo Calabresi, ‘CIA Chief : Pakistan Would Have Jeopardized Operation’, Time, May 3rd, 
2011, available at http://swampland.time.com/2011/05/03/cia-chief-breaks-silence-u-s-ruled-out-
involving-pakistan-in-bin-laden-raid-early-on/. That Osama bin Laden got supports in Pakistan leaves little 
room for doubt; more difficult however is to know whether this support came directly from members of the 
Pakistani government (secret services, army) or not. John Brennan, Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, declared during a press conference at the White House: “I think 
it’s inconceivable that bin Laden did not have a support system in the country that allowed him to remain 
there for an extended period of time. I am not going to speculate about what type of support he might have 
had on an official basis inside of Pakistan.” Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 9. See also Adam 
Entous, Julian E. Barnes, Matthew Rosenberg, ‘Signs Point to Pakistan Link’, The Wall Street Journal, 
May 4th, 2011, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704322804576303553679080310.html. 
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The statements, observations and speculations mentioned above may be 
summarized as follows: as bin Laden continued to pose an imminent threat to 
the United States, and as Pakistan was unable or unwilling to prevent Al-Qaida 
from using its territory as a base for launching attacks because the country was 
colluding with these non-state actors and consequently complicit in their 
activities, the United States was authorized to use military force in self-defense 
against bin Laden in the sovereign territory of Pakistan. 
In the opinion of the present writer, and taking into consideration scholarly 
works, international jurisprudence and State practice, Operation Trip to Atlantic 
City, as summarized above, does not comply with the law de lege lata, and, in 
particular, with the customary law of self-defense enshrined in the Article 51 of 
the UN Charter. This Article requires: “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”. 
It will be shown infra that the conditions of invocation and implementation 
of the right of self-defense have not been met in the case of Operation Trip to 
Atlantic City, and for these reasons the raid against bin Laden could not and 
should not have been justified by that right. Regarding the former condition, the 
view of the present writer is that the right of self-defense can only be invoked in 
the case of ongoing armed attack by a State
(13)
. The requirement for an armed 
attack to exist has been confirmed in the Nicaragua case by the International 
Court of Justice which held that such an attack is “the condition sine qua non 
required for the exercise of the right of […] self-defence”
(14)
. Furthermore, as it 
will be established, every armed attack within the compass of Article 51 of the 
UN Charter must be attributed to a State. However, after having analyzed the 
theory of complicity and having determined how it interlinks with the rules of 
attribution mentioned in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Act, it will be concluded that the activities of Al-
Qaida, including their immediate threat against the United States, were not and 
could not be attributed to Pakistan (I). With regard to the condition of 
implementation of the right of self-defense, after having analyzed the inherent 
                                      
(12) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, Speech of the Prime Minister in the National Assembly on the 
Abbottabad Incident, May 9th, 2011, available at  
http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2011/May/PM_09_05_2011.htm. 
(13) Eric Corthay, La lutte contre le terrorisme international, De la licéité du recours à la force armée, 
Bâle, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2012, at 93. 
(14) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 237 [hereinafter Nicaragua case]. See also, Oil 
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, para. 51 
[hereinafter Oil Platforms case]. 
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purposes underpinning any action in self-defense, as well as the consubstantial 
requirement of immediacy, it will be concluded that Operation Trip to Atlantic 
City – i.e. a military operation carried out in order to address an imminent threat 
and prevent future attacks – could not be justified by the current right enshrined 
in Article 51 of the UN Charter (II). 
I. The requirement of attribution of an injurious act to a State 
It has been stated by certain observers that Operation Trip to Atlantic City 
against bin Laden could have been justified by the right of self-defense. Also, 
the International Court of Justice held that an armed attack is “the condition sine 
qua non required for the exercise of the right of […] self-defence”
(15)
. As two of 
the most important actors in casu are Osama bin Laden and Pakistan, it would 
be interesting to answer the question whether an armed attack must be in law 
the act of a State or whether it can simply and only be the act of private 
individuals acting as such. 
Moreover, it has been implicitly stated that Pakistan was “unable or 
unwilling” to address the imminent threat posed by bin Laden
(16)
, or in other 
words that Pakistan did not appear to be able or did not wish to prevent future 
attacks or deter bin Laden from carrying out terrorist attacks notably against the 
United States. It is therefore necessary to determine whether in that case 
Pakistan was in breach of its obligation of due diligence, and if so, whether it 
could have been accomplice of the future attacks that bin Laden was allegedly 
about to launch, and whether such complicity could have engaged the 
international responsibility of Pakistan for the prospective injurious acts of bin 
Laden and his henchmen. 
1. Armed attacks are acts of States 
Terrorist attacks, as those perpetrated in New York (2001), Bali (2002), 
Casablanca (2003), Madrid (2004) or London (2004), show that non-state actors 
are capable of severely endangering national and international peace and 
security with at the very least the same degree of effectiveness and horror as the 
conduct of any conventional armed forces. Some scholars and certain members 
of the international community assert that an armed attack giving rise to the 
right of self-defense can be carried out by individuals or groups of individuals – 
the examples are very often those of terrorist groups – even when those entities 
have no sufficient connection with a State for attributing their violent conduct to 
                                      
(15) Nicaragua case, ibid. 
(16) See supra note 5. 
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. In light of the explanations provided by many scholars, the 
decisions of the International Court of Justice, and the analysis of the UN 
Security Council Resolutions, we are to conclude that, in law, an armed attack 
triggering a reaction in self-defense must be attributed to a State.  
1.1. The doctrinal debate 
Scholars are divided on the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
On one hand, part of the literature gives a very broad interpretation of Article 
51, first sentence. Within this group, some scholars rely on a literal 
interpretation of the Article to claim that nothing in its letter limits the exercise 
of the right of self-defense to the only case an armed attack is carried out by a 
State
(18)
.This opinion, according to which ultimately an armed attack could also 
be perpetrated by non-state actors, is notably shared by Yoram Dinstein. In his 
book entitled War, Aggression and Self-Defense, Dinstein writes that “for an 
armed attack to justify countermeasures of self-defence under Article 51, it need 
not be committed by another State”
(19)
. Then, he makes it clear that “[a]rmed 
attacks by non-State actors are still armed attacks, even if commenced only 
from – and not by – another State”
(20)
. 
Moreover, without focusing explicitly on the term “armed attack” per se, 
some scholars argue that the first sentence of Article 51 ultimately reflects a 
natural right of self-defense which emerged long before the adoption of the UN 
Charter in 1945 – the locus classicus systematically invoked to defend such an 
opinion is the Caroline case
(21)
 – and which included the right to respond to an 
attack or an immediate danger whoever the author of the attack or the danger is, 
it is to say a State or non-state actors whose conduct is not attributed to any 
                                      
(17) See James E. S. Fawcett, ‘Intervention in International law. A Study of Some Recent Cases’, 
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, 1961-II, at 363 [hereinafter Collected 
Courses…]; Guy B. Roberts, ‘Self-Help in Combatting State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-Defense and 
Peacetime Reprisals’, Case W.Res.J.Int’l L., vol. 19, num. 2, 1987, at 268; Ruth Wedgwood, ‘Responding 
to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden’, Yale J.Int'l L., vol. 24, num. 2, 1999, at 564; Thomas M. 
Franck, ‘Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense’, AJIL, vol. 95, num. 4, 2001, at 840; Jordan J. Paust, 
‘Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond’, Cornell Int’l L.J., vol. 35, num. 
3, 2002, at 534; Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘Entités non-étatiques et régime international de l’emploi de la force. 
Une étude sur le cas de la réaction israélienne au Liban’, RGDIP, t. 111, 2007, at 352; Separate Opinion of 
Judge Kooijmans in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 30 [hereinafter Republic Democratic of the Congo case]. 
(18) See Declaration of Judge Buergenthal and Separate Opinion of Judge Koojimans in Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 2004, resp. para. 6 and para. 36 [hereinafter Wall case]. 
(19) Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2001, at 192. 
(20) Ibid., at 214.  
(21) For an explanation of the facts of the incident, see Robert Y. Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod 
Cases’, AJIL, vol. 32, num. 1, 1938, at 82-99. 
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.Thus, Dereck W. Bowett stated: “The situation may arise in which the 
threat to a state’s political independence originates in the conduct of individuals 
or groups of individuals for which no state bears international responsibility. 
The most obvious example is the case in which a state uses due diligence, and 
therefore fulfils the duty imposed on it by international law, but is still unable to 
prevent individuals from organizing a hostile expedition or conducting other 
activities involving an immediate danger to another state’s political 
independence. In these circumstances the state on whose territory these 
preparations or activities occur is not in breach of any duty and, therefore, no 
action in self-defence can be directed against it by the state threatened by these 
preparations or activities. This is not to say that the threatened state is powerless 
to do anything to protect itself; it may take action in self-defence but such action 
must be directed solely at the individuals or groups responsible for the threat to 
or violation of its rights.”
(23)
 
On the other hand, another part of the literature, to which we subscribe, 
contends that an armed attack, to be qualified as such, must be an act of a State 
and that Article 51 of the UN Charter cannot be interpreted as authorizing the 
use of force in self-defense against non-state actors
(24)
. Indeed, we have serious 
reservations with regard to the opinion according to which the act that triggers a 
reaction in self-defense might be the conduct of a person or group of persons 
which is not attributed to a State. We are rather of the opinion that the act which 
triggers an action in self-defense must be an internationally wrongful act, i.e. an 
act of State. In the Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility, 
Roberto Ago considered that “the State takes action [in self-defense] after 
                                      
(22) See notably Humphrey Waldock, ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law’, Collected Courses…, t. 81, 1952-II, at 463-464, and 498; Barry Levenfeld, ‘Israel’s 
Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International Law’, 
Colum.J.Transnat’l L., vol. 21, num. 1, 1982-1983, at 28; Sean D. Murphy, ‘Terrorism and the Concept of 
‘Armed Attack’ in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter’, Harv.Int’l L. J., vol. 43, num. 1, 2002, at 50. 
(23) Dereck W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1958, at 55-56. See also Roy Emerson Curtis, ‘The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions as Applied by the 
United States’, AJIL, vol. 8, num. 2, 1914, at 236. 
(24) On the traditional interpretation of Article 51 according to which an armed attack is to be an act of the 
State, see inter alia Joseph L. Kunz, ‘Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations’, AJIL, vol. 41, num. 4, 1947, at 878: an armed attack “must not only be directed 
against a state, it must also be made by a state or with the approval of a state”; Hans Kelsen, ‘Collective 
Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the United Nations’, AJIL, vol. 42, num. 4, 
1948, at 791: an armed attack is conducted “by one state against another”; see also as a more recent 
literature, Eric P. J. Myjer, Nigel D. White, ‘The Twin Towers Attack : an Unlimited Right to Self-
Defence ?’, JCSL, vol. 7, 2002, at 7; Marcelo G. Kohen, ‘Is the Legal Argument for Self-Defence against 
Terrorism Correct ?’, in: Wybo P. Heere (ed.), From Government to Governance, The Growing Impact of 
Non-State Actors on the International and European Legal System, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2003, at 
290; Giovanni Distefano ‘La crise libanaise de l’été 2006 à l’aune du ius contra bellum’, Journal of Sharia 
and Law, vol. 22 (2008), at 33-45. 
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having suffered an international wrong, namely, the non-respect of one of its 
rights by the State against which the action in question is directed”
(25)
. Then, 
when clarifying the nature of the ‘wrong’, Ago underscored that “the only 
international wrong which, exceptionally, makes it permissible for the State to 
react against another State by recourse to force, despite the general ban on force, 
is an offence which itself constitutes a violation of the ban”
(26)
. When non-state 
actors launch an attack against a State from the territory of another one but their 
conduct is not attributed to any State, no internationally wrongful act is 
committed by them. In particular, no violation of the fundamental principle on 
the prohibition of the use of force as embodied in the Article 2, paragraph 4, of 
the UN Charter, and consequently no armed attack – the most severe form of the 
use of armed force – in the meaning of Article 51 occurs because the principle 
on the prohibition of the use of force applies only to States and in their relations 
with others. Therefore, according to Ago, in such a situation the victim State is 
not authorized to invoke the right of self-defense, although it is still lawful for 
the nation to take appropriate security measures within its territory in order to 
defend its citizens and maintain peace and security. 
1.2. The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice, which is the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations and whose task is mainly to explain the state of international law 
on particular points at a specific moment, has recalled many times that an armed 
attack is and must be understood as being an act of State. In 1986, in the 
Nicaragua case, the Court linked and quasi assimilated the concept of armed 
attack mentioned under Article 51 of the UN Charter with the concept of 
aggression used in the Annex (Definition of Aggression) to the Resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of the General Assembly
(27)
. Article I of the Annex defines the concept 
of aggression as “[…] the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this 
Definition”. In the Oil Platforms case of 2003, when answering the question 
whether the United States was authorized to exercise self-defense against Iran, 
the Court held that “[…] in order to establish that it was legally justified in 
attacking the Iranian platforms in exercise of the right of individual self-
defence, the United States has to show that attacks had been made upon it for 
which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of such a nature as to 
                                      
(25) Roberto Ago, ‘Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility: The internationally wrongful act 
of the State, source of international responsibility’, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 
II, Part One, 1980, at 54, para. 89 [hereinafter Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n]. 
(26) Ibid. 
(27) Nicaragua Case, supra note 14, para. 195. 
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be qualified as ‘armed attacks’ within the meaning of that expression in Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter, and as understood in customary law on the 
use of force”
(28)
. After having examined the arguments presented on each side, 
the Court “f[ound] that the evidence indicative of Iranian responsibility for the 
attack on the Sea Isle City [was] not sufficient to support the contentions of the 
United States” and concluded “that the burden of proof of the existence of an 
armed attack by Iran on the United States, in the form of the missile attack on 
the Sea Isle City, has not been discharged”
(29)
. One year later, in the Wall case, 
when answering the question whether the construction of a wall between Israel 
and Palestine could be justified by the right of self-defense, the Court held that 
“Article 51 of the Charter […] recognizes the existence of an inherent right of 
self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State.”
(30)
 
However, as “Israel [did] not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a 
foreign State” the Court concluded that Article 51 of the UN Charter had no 
relevance in this case
(31)
. 
1.3. The wording of the UN Security Council Resolutions 
Those who consider that an armed attack can be perpetrated by individuals 
even when their conduct is not attributed to a State refer sometimes to the 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 adopted by the Security Council in the wake of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. In the third paragraph of the preamble of Resolution 1368 
the Security Council recognized “the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence in accordance with the Charter”
(32)
. Therefore, some authors affirm 
that the Security Council recognized the right for the United States to react in 
self-defense against Al-Qaida irrespective of the fact that their terrorist attacks 
had not been attributed to any State
(33)
. However, such an interpretation of the 
wording of the aforementioned resolutions did not win unanimous support
(34)
. 
Indeed, it is important to note that these two resolutions are the only ones that 
refer to the right of self-defense among the many resolutions adopted by the 
                                      
(28) Oil Platforms case, supra note 14, para 51 (emphasis added). 
(29) Ibid., para. 61. 
(30) Wall case, supra note 18, para. 139. 
(31) Ibid. 
(32) The Security Council reaffirms the same right in Resolution 1373 (2001). 
(33) See Separate Opinion of Judge Koojimans and Declaration of Judge Buergenthal in Wall case, supra 
note 18, para. 35 and para. 6 resp.; Separate Opinion of Judge Simma in Republic Democratic of the Congo 
case, supra note 17, para. 11. See also Thomas M. Franck, ‘Terrorism…’, supra note 17, at 840; 
Christopher Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and 
Iraq’, SDILJ, vol. 4, 2003, at 17. 
(34) See for example Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘What Responses to Counter-Terrorism? Or the Problem of 
Accountability’, in: Heere Wybo P. (ed.), supra note 24, at 274. 
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Security Council after terrorist attacks
(35)
. Thus, we may doubt the consistency 
of the Security Council practice. In fact, we prefer to embrace the opinion of 
Olivier Corten who suggests that the recognition of the right of self-defense by 
the Security Council in its Resolutions 1368 and 1373 should be interpreted as a 
reminder of a relevant international rule which can apply only if its whole 
conditions of implementation are fulfilled
(36)
. We maintain that one of these 
conditions is that armed attacks be attributed to States, this having been 
reaffirmed on several occasions by the International Court of Justice, not only 
before, but also after September 2001
(37)
. 
2. The rules of attribution and the theory of complicity  
As explained above, an armed attack – the condition sine qua non required 
for giving rise to the right of self-defense
(38)
 – is and can only be the conduct of 
a State. In other words, in order to assess if a terrorist act is susceptible to being 
referred to as an armed attack, it is inter alia necessary to determine if such an 
act is attributable to a State, and for that we need to apply the rules of attribution 
mentioned under Chapter II of the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts
(39)
. Chapter II specifies the limitative conditions 
under which a conduct is attributable to a State
(40)
. However, in casu none of 
these conditions have been invoked by the United States to declare that the 
activities of Al-Qaida, and in particular the imminent threat posed by bin Laden, 
were attributable to Pakistan. Indeed, never once did the Obama Administration 
contend that bin Laden and his group were de jure organs of Pakistan (Art. 4), 
or that their conduct was carried out on the instructions or under the direction or 
control of Pakistan (Art. 8), or that their actions had been acknowledged and 
adopted by the Pakistani authorities ex post facto (Art. 11).  
Nevertheless, many scholars and law practitioners who have justified the 
legality of Operation Trip to Atlantic City have declared or endorsed the opinion 
that when a State is ‘unwilling or unable’ to prevent individuals from using its 
territory for launching terrorist attacks, it may be lawful for the targeted State to 
                                      
(35) See for example Resolution 1438 (2002) condemning the terrorist attacks in Bali, Resolution 1440 
(2002) condemning the act of taking hostages in Moscow, Resolution 1450 (2002) condemning the 
terrorist bomb attack at the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala (Kenya) and the attempting missile attack on 
Arkia Israeli Airline flight 582 departing Mombasa (Kenya), Resolution 1530 (2004) condemning the 
bomb attacks in Madrid, and Resolution 1611 (2005) condemning the terrorist attacks in London. 
(36) Olivier Corten, ‘Vers un renforcement des pouvoirs du Conseil de sécurité dans la lutte contre le 
terrorisme?’, in: Bannelier Karine, et al. (ed. by), Le Droit international face au terrorisme, CEDIN-Paris 
I, Pedone, Cahiers internationaux num. 17, 2002, at 264. 
(37) See supra notes 27 to 31. 
(38) Nicaragua case, supra note 14, para. 237. 
(39) See Annex to Resolution 56/83 of the General Assembly [hereinafter ILC Articles]. 
(40) The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has affirmed that “in order to attribute an act to the State, it is 
necessary to identify with reasonable certainty the actors and their association with the State”, Kenneth P. 
Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R. vol. 17, 1987, at 101-102.  
10
Journal Sharia and Law, Vol. 2015, No. 63 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2015/iss63/10




33 [College of  Law UAE University]                                       
 
use force in self-defense in order to address that threat
(41)
. This raises the 
question of whether a new condition of attribution has emerged, and more 
exactly whether a failure to prevent or punish terrorist attacks conducted by 
non-state actors justifies inferring the host State’s complicity in the individuals’ 
acts, and consequently regarding the terrorist acts as the conduct of the host 
State. 
2.1. The theory of complicity and the standard of due diligence 
According to the theory of complicity, “an action committed by an individual 
can be attributed to the State as a source of international responsibility, provided 
that other factors were involved in its commission, particularly failure to 
prevent the act or to react a posteriori and that such omissions derived directly 
from the State, i.e., from its organs”
(42)
. This theory, still invoked today by some 
scholars in the context of the fight against terrorism
(43)
, was derived from 
Grotius who considered that the nation participated in a crime committed by a 
person if nothing was done to prevent the crime or to punish or hand over the 
offender
(44)
. According to this controversial theory, the actions carried out in the 
territory of the victim State by private entities residing in the territory of the 
host State are attributed to that latter State, not because the private entities 
would have acted on its behalf, on its instructions, or under its direction or 
control – what is not the case when individuals remain entirely outside the 
machinery of the host State –, but simply because the host State has failed to 
fulfill its ex ante facto duty of not tolerating the preparation in its territory of 
actions directed against the victim State, or its ex post facto duty of prosecuting 
and punishing the offenders for their wrong
(45)
. In other words, States would be 
                                      
(41) See supra notes 3 to 6. 
(42) Roberto Ago, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility, The internationally wrongful act of the State, 
source of international responsibility’, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, vol. II, 1972, at 121, para. 139. This theory is 
rejected by Ago. 
(43) Sean D. Murphy, supra note 22, at 51; Yoram Dinstein, ‘Comments on the Presentations by Nico 
Kirsch and Carsten Stahn’, in: Walter Christian, et al. (eds), Terrorism as a Challenge for National and 
International Law: Security versus Liberty?, Heidelberg, Springer, 2004, at 920; Michael Byers, ‘Not yet 
havoc: geopolitical change and the international rules on military force’, Review of International Studies, 
vol. 31, supplement, 2005, at 58; Davis Brown, ‘Use of Force against Terrorism after September 11th: 
State Responsibility, Self-Defense and other Responses’, Cardozo J.Int'l & Comp.L., vol. 11, num. 1, 
2003, at 17 and 52. 
(44) Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, Amsterdam, MDCXLVI, lib. II, at 366 ff. The theory 
of complicity was also invoked after Grotius; see notably Emmerich De Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou 
Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains 
(1758), in: James B. Scott (ed.), The Classics of International Law, Washington, Carnedgie Institution of 
Washington, 1916, Vol. I, Book II, Chap. VI, para. 74; Edwin M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of 
Citizens Abroad or the Law of International Claims, New York, Banks Law Publishing, 1916, at 217; 
James L. Brierly, ‘The Theory of Implied State Complicity in International Claims’, BYIL, vol. 9, 1928, at 
42 ff, esp. at 49. 
(45) Roberto Ago, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility…’, supra note 42, at 119-120, para. 135. 
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complicit and would be held responsible for the conduct of individuals when 
they fail to fulfill their international obligations of vigilance, protection and 
control. Such an obligation of due diligence can be broadly defined as a 
requirement for each State to protect other States, as well as the representatives 
and the nationals of these other States, against the illicit acts carried out or about 
to be perpetrated by individuals, when these acts are conceived, prepared and/or 
carried out within its territory or under its jurisdiction
(46)
. The International 
Court of Justice has long recognized “every State’s obligation not to allow 




2.1.1. Scope of the obligation of due diligence 
The obligation of due diligence is composed of two duties: to prevent as well 
as to repress wrongful acts of individuals
(48)
. With regard to international 
terrorism, due diligence means in particular that States should not let their 
territories become springboards for terrorist attacks against third States
(49)
. 
States must abstain from any passive or active support to terrorists acting or 
about to act against other States or nationals of other States and must take 
measures to prevent and repress any terrorist activity. Concerning the 
preventive side, due diligence means that not only must States abstain from 
tolerating the organization of terrorist activities on their territories (passive 
support), but that they must also abstain from providing any support or 
encouragement to terrorists who plan attacks against another State (active 
support). In concrete terms, States must ensure that their territories do not host 
any terrorist installations or training camps and must refrain in particular from 
funding, arming, training, and providing logistical support to terrorist groups. 
Concerning the repressive side, due diligence implies that States must arrest, 
prosecute, bring to justice or extradite terrorists and their accomplices. 
Obligations of due diligence relating to terrorism have been expressed in 
many legal instruments, and in particular in several resolutions of the General 
                                      
(46) See also Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons against Foreign States’, 
AJIL, vol. 22, num. 1, 1928, at 126; Condorelli Luigi, ‘L’imputation à l’Etat d’un fait internationalement 
illicite: solutions classiques et nouvelles tendances’, Collected Courses…, t. 189, 1984-VI, at 111-114; 
Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of International Responsibility of 
States’, GYIL, vol. 35, 1992, at 34 ff.; Jean Salmon (dir.), Dictionnaire de droit international public, 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2001, at 770; François Dubuisson, ‘Vers un renforcement des obligations de diligence 
en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme?’, in: Bannelier Karine, et al. (ed. by), supra note 36, at 141-157. 
(47) Corfu Channel case, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, at 22. 
(48) See the arbitral award of Max Huber related to the Biens britanniques au Maroc espagnol (Spain v. 
United Kingdom), 1st May 1925, RIAA, vol. II, at 645: “la responsabilité de l’Etat peut être engagée […] 
non seulement par un manque de vigilance dans la prévention des actes dommageables, mais aussi par un 
manque de diligence dans la poursuite pénale des fauteurs, ainsi que dans l’application des sanctions 
civiles voulues”. 
(49) Dinstein Yoram, ‘Comments…’, supra note 43, at 922. 
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Assembly and the Security Council
(50)
. An example of such documents is the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, a document annexed to Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the General 
Assembly. The eighth and ninth paragraphs related to the fundamental principle 
on the prohibition of the use of force – paragraphs which reflect the customary 
law
(51)
 – provide:  
“Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the 
organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for 
incursion into the territory of another State. 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing 
in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of 
such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or 
use of force.” 
Several years later, the General Assembly adopted resolutions pertaining 
more specifically to the fight against international terrorism in which the 
measures that States are urged to implement after the perpetration of terrorist 
acts were added to the measures that States are requested to adopt before such a 
perpetration. Thus, the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism – annex to Resolution 49/60, adopted in December 9
th
 1994 – states:  
“5. States must also fulfill their obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations and other provisions of international law with respect to combating 
international terrorism and are urged to take effective and resolute measures in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of international law and international 
standards of human rights for the speedy and final elimination of international 
terrorism, in particular: 
(a) To refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, financing, 
encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities and to take appropriate practical 
measures to ensure that their respective territories are not used for terrorist 
installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist 
acts intended to be committed against other States or their citizens; 
(b) To ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators 
of terrorist acts, in accordance with the relevant provisions of their national law 
                                      
(50) See the list of General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions on terrorism, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/terrorism. 
(51) See Nicaragua case, supra note 14, para. 191. 
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2.1.2. Limits to the obligation of due diligence 
The obligation of vigilance is not absolute. It is an obligation of conduct and 
not of result. Indeed, in the Genocide Convention case the International Court of 
Justice held: “it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not 
one of result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, 
whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide […]”
(53)
. 
The principle thus established, with regard to the prevention of the acts of 
genocide, can be generalized. In other words, a State in whose territory non-
state actors foment terrorist acts against other States is not “under an obligation 
to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission” of such 
terrorist acts. Two criteria must be examined in order to appreciate if, by its 
behavior, a State has fulfilled its obligation of due diligence: a) its knowledge of 
the acts – i.e. their planning, funding, etc. – injurious to other States, and b) the 
implementation of all means available to it. When a terrorist attack has been 
conducted by non-state actors from the territory of State A against State B, if 
State A was, in good faith, not aware of the preparation of that attack, or if it 
had unsuccessfully put into action all available means to halt that attack, then 
State A has not infringed its obligation of due diligence and therefore has not 
engaged its international responsibility. 
The first criterion – the knowledge by the host State of a particular conduct – 
has been recalled by the Court. In the Corfu Channel case, for example, it was 
held that “Albania’s obligation to notify shipping of the existence of mines in 
her waters depends on her having obtained knowledge of that fact […]”
(54)
. As 
regards international terrorism, acts – or their planning – of non-state actors 
injurious to other States can be brought to the knowledge of the host State in 
various manners. This is the case, notably, when the host State participates in 
one way or another (e.g. plan, encourage, aid) in the terrorist act
(55)
, when it 
tolerates the operation in question, or when it is informed by intelligence 
services or by the victim State itself about the planning, preparation and 
                                      
(52) This Resolution was invoked by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey in 1996 who stated that 
“shelter and support” provided by the Syrian Arab Republic to the PKK (group described as a terrorist 
organization by Turkey) contradict “the commitment of all Member States, under the Declaration 
contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 49/60”. Letter dated 21 June 1996 from the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc. S/1996/479. 
(53) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 430 [hereinafter 
Genocide Convention case]. 
(54) Corfu Channel case, supra note 47, at 22. 
(55) Nicaragua case, supra note 14, para. 118 and para. 256. 
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imminent commission of acts of terrorism from its territory
(56)
. However, in the 
context of the fight against international terrorism, the knowledge test is not 
systematically satisfied. Indeed, in spite of the serious and professional work 
provided by its intelligence services, the host State is sometimes not aware of 
what is being plotted by terrorist groups, and this is due to the clear fact that the 
planning – and in particular the funding – of non-state actors’ terrorist 
operations often occurs in the greatest secrecy. 
The second criterion means that the host State has the obligation to 
implement – by making a reasonable effort and acting in good faith – all 
available measures in order to avoid its territory being used by individuals who 
would conduct acts injurious to others States, or to repress ex post facto such 
acts
(57)
. It is worth noting that States are not required to do the impossible. The 
host State is merely requested to act – i.e. to prevent, to repress – to the extent 
that it can and in compliance with the law it is bound to. In that situation, the 
obligation of conduct is considered as fulfilled and the host State cannot be 
accused of tolerating or acquiescing to the terrorist activities, even if it has not 
been able to efficiently prevent or repress such activities
(58)
. In the Genocide 
Convention case, the Court held that the obligation of States parties to the 
Convention is “to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to 
prevent genocide so far as possible”
(59)
. The Court also stated: “A State does not 
incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved; 
responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all 
measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might 
have contributed to preventing the genocide.”
(60)
 In the context of the fight 
against international terrorism, the statement of the Court means that when a 
State, which has the capacity to prevent non-state actors from planning and 
launching terrorist attacks from its territory, deliberately decides not to react and 
stop such attacks, then that State is in breach of its obligation of due diligence. 
However, the host State does not engage its responsibility when it is unable to 
prevent or to repress the attacks
(61)
. In the Iranian Hostages case, the Court 
                                      
(56) Richard B. Lillich, John M. Paxman, ‘State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by 
Terrorist Activities’, Am.U.L.Rev., vol. 26, num. 2, 1977, at 275. 
(57) See Robert Jennings, Arthur Watts (ed.), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. I: Peace, London, New 
York, Longman, 9th ed., 1996, at 549; see also Roy Emerson Curtis, supra note 23, at 224 ff. 
(58) See Republic Democratic of the Congo case, supra note 17, para. 301: “the Court cannot conclude that 
the absence of action by Zaire’s Government against the rebel groups in the border area is tantamount to 
‘tolerating’ or ‘acquiescing’ in their activities”. 
(59) Genocide Convention case, supra note 53, para. 430 (emphasis added). 
(60) Ibid. 
(61) See André Nollkaemper, ‘Attribution of Forcible Acts to States: Connections between the Law on the 
Use of Force and the Law of State Responsibility’, in: Niels Blokker, Nico Schrijver (ed.), The Security 
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linked the violation by Iran of its obligation of due diligence with the violation 
of its treaty and customary obligations
(62)
 relating to the protection of the 
diplomatic and consular staff. Thus, in regard to the first phase of the events, the 
Court concluded that the Iranian authorities “failed to use the means which were 
at their disposal to comply with their obligations”
(63)
, i.e. to prevent or to bring 
to a halt the attack by pro-government militants against the United States’ 
Embassy in Tehran and the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz on 4 and 5 
November 1979 respectively, as well as to protect the premises, staff and 
archives of the mission
(64)
. The Court held that such failures were not a “lack of 
appropriate means”
(65)
. Evidence of this arose from the fact that on several 




 November, the 
Iranian authorities had been able to intervene “quickly and effectively” to 
protect and clear foreign embassies and consulates, thus frustrating or 
terminating invasions or attempted invasions
(66)
. Without mentioning expressis 
verbis a violation of the obligation of due diligence, the Court held that the 
inaction of the Iranian authorities entailed a breach of the 1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular 




Establishing whether a State has employed all means reasonably available is 
a matter that must be determined in light of the circumstances specific to each 
case. Indeed, as noted by Garcia Amador “[t]he learned authorities are in almost 
unanimous agreement that the rule of “due diligence” cannot be reduced to a 
clear and accurate definition which might serve as an objective and automatic 
standard for deciding, regardless of the circumstances, whether a State was 
“diligent” in discharging its duty of vigilance and protection. On the contrary, 
the conduct of the authorities must, in each particular case, be judged in the 
light of the circumstances.”
(68)
 Such a judgment is never easy to formulate, as 
each party involved in a specific confrontation usually tends to raise and put 
forward arguments deriving from its own interpretation or view of the reality. 
Thus, for example, during the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, Israel 
                                                                                                   
Council and the Use of Force, Theory and Reality – A Need for Change?, Leiden, Boston, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005, at 161. 
(62) United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, para. 430 
[hereinafter Iranian Hostages case]. 
(63) Ibid., para. 68. 
(64) Ibid., para. 63. 
(65) Ibid. 
(66) Ibid., para. 64 and 65. 
(67) Ibid., para. 67. 
(68) F. V. Garcia Amador, ‘International responsibility: Second report’, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, 1957, at 
122, para. 7. 
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accused Lebanon of having “allowed to be amassed in the southern part of its 
territory” thousands of rockets
(69)
. In response the Lebanese Government 
retorted that it “has spared no effort with regard to national dialogue and a 
political process to arrive at a situation in which the State […] can extend its 
sovereignty over all its national territory”
(70)
. 
Although it is a priori difficult to determine whether a State has employed all 
means reasonably available to prevent or repress non-state actors’ conducts and 
consequently discharged itself of its obligation of due diligence, the 
International Court of Justice has however provided for some parameters to 
facilitate that assessment. In the Genocide Convention case, the Court held that 
an important parameter to take into account was “the capacity to influence 
effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, 
genocide”
(71)
. For the Court, “[t]his capacity itself depends, among other things, 
[…] on the strength of the political links, as well as links of all other kinds, 
between the authorities of that State and the main actors in the events.”
(72)
 When 
applied to the context of the fight against international terrorism, the Court’s 
statement would mean, for example, that the stronger the links between terrorist 
groups, which plan acts injurious to other States, and the authorities of their host 
State are, the more important the capacity of that State to influence effectively 
the terrorists in order to convince them not to implement their deadly operations 
is. Therefore, the more important the capacity to influence is, the higher the 
threshold required to consider as reasonable the available means employed by 
the host State is. In the event that the ties between non-state actors and their host 
State are very intense, it may be claimed that the implementation of the 
measures available to the State would reach the required threshold of 
reasonableness only if that State effectively succeeds in stopping the terrorist act 
in preparation on its sovereign territory. 
Finally, it is difficult to assess in abstracto whether a host State, which has 
sufficient material capacity to prevent or repress terrorist acts injurious to other 
States but at the same time where a large part of the population is favorable to 
the cause of terrorists, would breach its obligation of due diligence or not by 
refusing to react effectively against the terrorists. In this case, the means 
available to the State are very limited; a military or police operation carried out 
against those terrorists could cause a political suicide for the authorities and 
                                      
(69) Israel, UN Doc. S/PV.5503, 31 July 2006, at 4. 
(70) Ibid. at 5. 
(71) Genocide Convention case, supra note 53, para. 430. 
(72) Ibid. 
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some internal unrest, and could eventually increase the threat to peace in the 
region, which is certainly not the wish of the United Nations for whom one of 
the main purposes is “to maintain international peace and security”
(73)
. The 
question of how the host State can duly discharge the obligation concerned calls 
for an assessment in concreto. Measures available to the State may certainly be 
limited, but they are not, however, nonexistent. The social and political 
configuration of the country – however complex it may be – does not clear the 
host State of its responsibility
(74)
. As the obligation of due diligence is one of 
conduct and not one of result, the host State could still bring its internal 
situation to the attention of the international community – i.e. to the Security 
Council and the General Assembly
(75)
 – and request help in order to deal with a 
complex internal context that might lead to international friction or dispute with 
the State targeted or about to be targeted by the terrorists. If, in doing so, the 
host State employs all means reasonably available, then it does not engage its 
international responsibility, even if terrorist operations or terrorists are not 
prevented in time or repressed effectively. 
2.2. The theory of complicity in light of actual State practice 
The theory of complicity has sometimes been invoked to justify a military 
operation in self-defense against terrorists. Indeed, the intervening State has 
sometimes contended that the country from whose territory private individuals 
have prepared and carried out terrorist actions is held responsible for these 
actions because that country was not able to prevent them – for example, the 
country aided and harbored terrorists, organized, instigated, assisted in terrorist 
acts – or to repress them appropriately. 
In order to determine whether the theory of complicity, as a condition of 
attribution of acts of private individuals to a State, has emerged as a new rule of 
customary law, it is necessary to identify and analyze the State practice accepted 
as law. Indeed, the make-up of a custom depends on two basic elements. In the 
Libya/Malta case, the International Court of Justice noted that “the material of 
customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice 
and opinio juris of States”
(76)
. In other words, the two elements to take into 
account when identifying the existence or emergence of a rule of customary law 
are “the material facts that is the actual behavior of states, and the psychological 
or subjective belief that such behavior is ‘law’.”
(77)
 The essential components of 
                                      
(73) See Art. 1, para. 1, of the UN Charter. 
(74) See Richard B. Lillich, John M. Paxman, supra note 56, at 269-270; contra Richard A. Falk, ‘The 
Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation’, AJIL, vol. 63, num. 3.1969, at 415-443. 
(75) See Art. 35 of the UN Charter. 
(76) Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, para. 
27. 
(77) Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 6th ed., 2008, at 74. 
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the actual practice engaged in by States – i.e. what they say, what they do, even 
their silence – are its consistency and uniformity. In the Asylum case, the 
International Court of Justice declared that a customary rule must be “in 
accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in 
question”
(78)
. The existence of a rule of customary law cannot be inferred from 
an actual State practice which is not constant and uniform. 
In the case of Operation Trip to Atlantic City, certain legal and former legal 
advisers contended, more or less explicitly, that the United States had the right 
to use force in self-defense on the territory of Pakistan to address the imminent 
threat posed by bin Laden, as Pakistan was unwilling or unable to prevent bin 
Laden and his terrorist group from using the Pakistani territory as a base for 
launching attacks
(79)
. In their view, this implies that because Pakistan was 
unwilling or unable to prevent bin Laden’s terrorist operations, the country 
would have been complicit with the terrorists and therefore their conduct (e.g. 
threatening, planning and implementing operations against other countries) 
would have been attributable to Pakistan. 
Before May 2011, the ‘unwilling or unable’ test, as well as the theory of 
complicity construed as a cause of attribution, had been invoked by some States 
– especially by Israel, Iran, and the United States. This was notably the case 
during the Israeli airstrike against the international airport of Beirut (1968), the 
Israeli raid in Southern Lebanon (1974), Operation Peace for Galilee (1982), 
the Iranian airstrikes against the Mujahidin e-Khalq Organisation’s camps in 
Iraq (1999), and Operation Enduring Freedom (2001)
 (80)
. Thus, with respect to 
Operation Enduring Freedom, for example, President George W. Bush stated in 
September 2001: “By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is 
committing murder.”
(81)
 A few weeks later, the US Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations, John D. Negroponte, stated that “the United States of 
America, together with other States, has initiated actions in the exercise of its 
inherent right or individual and collective self-defence following the armed 
attacks that were carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001.” 
Then, Negroponte pointed out that the attacks and the ongoing threat to his 
country posed by Al-Qaida “have been made possible by the decision of the 
                                      
(78) Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1950, at 276 [hereinafter Asylum case]. 
(79) See supra notes 3 to 6. 
(80) Eric Corthay, supra note 13, at 189-204. 
(81) President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 
September 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. See 
also Resolution 796 (1293/01) of the Organization of American States, dated 19 September 2001: “those 
that aid, abet or harbour terrorist organizations are responsible for the acts of those terrorists”. 
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Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by 
this organization as a base of operation”
(82)
. 
It is worth mentioning that many States have also condemned the military 
operations mentioned supra as being aggressions, acts of aggression, reprisals, 
or violations of the international law
(83)
. For example, in 1968 the Security 
Council “[condemned] Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of 
its obligation under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions”
(84)
, and in 1974 
the Security Council “condemn[ed] Israel’s violation of Lebanon’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty and call[ed] once more on the Government of Israel to 
refrain from further military actions and threats against Lebanon”
(85)
. Even in 
2001, some States firmly condemned Operation Enduring Freedom. Cuba, for 
example, stated that “a powerful State must not invoke the right to self-defence 
in order unilaterally to unleash a war that might have unpredictable effects on a 
global scale”
(86)
. Many States however remained silent on the legality of the 
operation, but it is not easy to determine whether such a silence was the 
expression of their approbation or, on the contrary, of their condemnation of the 
operation.  
Nevertheless, with regard to the operations mentioned supra, the amount of 
difficulty in drawing any valid conclusion in law – i.e. a confirmation or 
rejection of the theory of complicity as a condition of attribution – from the 
declarations or conduct of the third States must be stressed, because they rarely 
explained precisely the legal reasons why they supported or rejected the conduct 
of the intervening States: existence, or not, of an armed attack? Attribution, or 
not, of the terrorist conduct to the host State in general? Recognition, or not, of 
the theory of complicity in particular? 
2.3. Terrorists’ conduct and States’ conduct: two differing acts 
Before determining whether the conduct of bin Laden can be attributed to 
Pakistan, it is necessary to assess whether the country has breached its 
obligation of due diligence. As it is not clear – the views expressed by organs of 
the US and Pakistani Governments were conflicting – whether Pakistan was 
unwilling or simply unable “to ameliorate the threat from bin Laden”
(87)
, it is 
necessary to analyze both assumptions. 
First, based on what was mentioned supra regarding the scope of the 
                                      
(82) Ibid. 
(83) See Eric Corthay, supra note 13, at 189-204. 
(84) UN Security Council Resolution 262 (1968). 
(85) UN Security Council Resolution 347 (1974). 
(86) UN Doc. A/56/PV.13, 1st October 2001, at 15. Other firm condemnations came from Iraq and North 
Korea, see UN Doc. A/56/PV.51, 13 November 2001, and UN Doc. A/56/PV.52, 14 November 2001. 
(87) See supra note 6. 
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standard of due diligence, it must be contended that the alleged fact that 
Pakistan was ‘unable to prevent’ bin Laden from using the national territory for 
threatening other States, in particular the United States, and launching terrorists 
attacks, does not automatically imply a violation of its obligation, as due 
diligence is an obligation of conduct and not of result and because a State that 
employs all reasonable means available to prevent or repress injurious acts 
fulfills its obligations
(88)
. Furthermore, in the event Pakistan wasn’t aware of the 
presence of bin Laden in the national territory, that country cannot be accused 
of breaching its obligation as the existence of a duty of due diligence depends 
on the country having obtained knowledge of the fact that someone preparing 
injurious acts was on its territory
(89)
. 
Then, and contrariwise, in the event that Pakistan was unwilling to take 
measures against bin Laden – i.e. in good faith the country had the capacity for 
neutralizing bin Laden but didn’t want to – the legal consequences for the 
country are totally different. In that case, Pakistan would have breached its 
obligation of due diligence as the country would have refused to employ all 
reasonable means available in order to act appropriately. 
It is worth noting that a violation of the obligation of due diligence by 
Pakistan doesn’t at all imply that Pakistan engages its international 
responsibility for the injurious conduct of bin Laden and his acolytes. Indeed, 
acts committed by private individuals acting as such cannot be considered as 
acts of the State and therefore the latter is not held responsible for the acts of the 
formers
(90)
. Nevertheless, actions of private individuals might reveal the 
existence of an internationally wrongful act – an action or omission of organs of 
the State –, and it is that very wrongful act which would entail the international 
responsibility of the State. The International Law Commission’s Special 
Rapporteur Roberto Ago explained why the act of the individual could not be 
considered as an act of the State by using the example of someone who 
succeeded in entering the premises of a foreign embassy and causing damage: 
“There is no doubt that if the offender was, for example, a police officer acting 
in his official capacity, the State would have been specifically accused of having 
violated its obligation to respect the inviolability of the embassy premises and 
archives. If it was established that, since the offender was a private individual, 
the State was not accused of having violated the inviolability of the embassy but 
of having breached a totally different obligation – namely to ensure, with due 
                                      
(88) See Genocide Convention case, supra note 53, para. 430. 
(89) See by analogy, Corfu Channel case, supra note 47, at 22. 
(90) Roberto Ago, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility…’ supra note 42, at 96, para. 63. 
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diligence, that such crimes do not occur – the inferences of that finding should 
be coherently drawn. The State would not be held responsible for the action of 
the individual but for the omission committed in connexion with that action by 
the organs responsible for surveillance.”
(91)
 
In that context, the acts of individuals are described as ‘catalysts’, and what 
is attributed to the State and might involve its international responsibility are not 
the catalysts per se but State conduct which is revealed by the catalysts
(92)
. 
Roberto Ago clearly stated: “Actions and omissions by individuals who are and 
remain individuals are not attributed to the State under international law and do 
not become ‘acts of the State’ which, as such, may involve its responsibility 
towards other States. The acts of private individuals which cause injury to 
foreign States, to their representatives or to their subjects are often the occasion 
of an internationally wrongful act of the State, but of a wrongful act which is 
represented by the conduct of State organs. Moreover, they often constitute an 
external event which assumes the value of a catalyst causing the wrongfulness 
of the conduct of those organs with respect to the actual situation. But the State 
is internationally responsible only for the action, and more often for the 
omission, of its organs which are guilty of not having done everything within 
their power to prevent the individual’s injurious action or to punish it suitably in 
the event that it has nevertheless occurred.”
(93)
 
In the context of the fight against international terrorism, the catalysts – i.e. 
the conduct of terrorists acting as private individuals – might highlight the 
violation of the due diligence obligation by the State in whose territory terrorist 
actions are conceived and prepared, in other words the violation of the duty to 
prevent terrorist attacks and/or to punish their acts injurious to the other States. 
Such a breach arises notably when the host State uses indirect force, examples 
of which are listed in the annex to Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the General 
Assembly: organizing, assisting in terrorists acts in another State, acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory, etc. 
(94)
. When infringing its due 
diligence obligation, the host State engages its international responsibility 
towards other States and is required to cease the wrongful conduct and to make 
full reparation for the injury caused
(95)
. 
For its part, the target State – in casu the United States – has the right to take 
countermeasures against the host State – i.e. Pakistan – in order to induce the 
                                      
(91) Ibid., para. 65. 
(92) Ibid. See also Luigi Condorelli, ‘L’imputation à l’Etat…’, supra note 46, at 100-101. 
(93) Roberto Ago, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility…’, supra note 42, at 123, para. 140. 
(94) See supra note 50. 
(95) See ILC Articles, supra note 39, Art. 28, 30 and 31. 
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latter to comply with its international obligations
(96)
 – for example the obligation 
not to infringe the principle prohibiting the use of force embodied in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the UN Charter and referred to in the annex to Resolution 2625 
(XXV). However, the targeted State is not allowed to unilaterally use armed 
force against the host State and to invoke self-defense as a justification for its 
action
(97)
, as the acts attributed to that latter State (i.e. assisting, acquiescing, 
etc.) do not constitute an armed attack which is, as already mentioned, “the 
condition sine qua non required for the exercise of the right of […] self-
defence”
(98)
. Indeed, in the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice 
held: “As regards certain particular aspects of the principle [prohibiting the use 
of force], it will be necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of 
force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms.”
(99)
 
Then, the Court added: “In determining the legal rule which applies to these 
latter forms, the Court can again draw on the formulation contained in the 
Declaration” on Friendly Relations (General Assembly Resolution 2625 
(XXV))
(100)
. Finally, as regards the Declaration, the Court stated: “Alongside 
certain descriptions which may refer to aggression, this text includes others 
which refer only to less grave forms of the use of force. In particular, according 
to this resolution: […]  
‘Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the 
organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for 
incursion into the territory of another State. 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing 
in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of 




For the reasons mentioned above, it is unlawful to hold the host State 
responsible for the terrorist ‘operations’ of private individuals under the pretext 
that the country is unable or unwilling to prevent or repress those operations. 
Moreover, the same conclusion applies in regards to the ‘preparation’ of 
terrorist operations that causes an imminent threat to other countries. 
                                      
(96) Ibid., Art. 49. 
(97) See Antonio Cassese, ‘The International Community’s ‘Legal’ Response to Terrorism’, ICLQ, vol. 38, 
num. 3, 1989, at 597; Jordan J. Paust, supra note 17, at 540. 
(98) Nicaragua case, supra note 14, para. 237. See also Oil Platforms case, supra note 14, para. 51. 
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Finally, as further evidence of the rejection by customary law of the theory of 
complicity as a condition of attribution of private individuals’ conduct to their 
host State, it is interesting to note that the International Law Commission, which 
is responsible for the codification and progressive development of international 
law, did not include the theory of complicity in the limitative conditions of 
attribution listed in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
internationally Wrongful Acts presented to the General Assembly in 2001 after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks
(102)
. 
II. The purpose of an action in self-defense 
In the case of Operation Trip to Atlantic City, it has been stated: “where a 
state is unwilling or unable to [prevent terrorists from using its territory as a 
base for launching attacks], it may be lawful for the targeted state to use military 
force in self-defense to address that threat.”
(103)
 This raises the question of the 
inherent purpose of self-defense. Although scholars and States agree on some 
specific and limited purposes for which a military operation can be launched in 
self-defense, since 1945 – and especially in the context of the fight against 
international terrorism – some scholars and Members of the international 
community however have been trying to broaden the rationale for self-defense.  
1. From halting an armed attack to preventing an attack 
The very large majority of States and scholars agree that the purpose of a 
military operation launched in self-defense is to halt and/or to repel an armed 
attack
(104)
. Roberto Ago underscored that “the objective to be achieved by the 
conduct in question [i.e. self-defense], its raison d’être, is necessarily that of 
repelling an attack and preventing it from succeeding, and nothing else”
(105)
. In 
the opinion of the present writer, the term ‘preventing it from succeeding” might 
be interpreted as meaning ‘defeating an ongoing armed attack’
(106)
.  
For many years, however, some scholars have been invoking other more 
controversial purposes for the right of self-defense. According to those scholars, 
                                      
(102) See Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001 in which the General Assembly took note of the articles. 
(103) See supra note 6. 
(104) See notably Antonio Cassese, ‘Article 51’, in: Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet (dir.), La Charte des 
Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, Paris, Economica, 2nd ed., 1991, at 775; Oscar Schachter, 
‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’, Mich.L.Rev., vol. 82, num. 5 & 6, 1984, at 254; Rosalyn 
Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, at 
232; Judith Gardam, ‘Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello’, in: Laurence 
Boisson de Chazournes , Philippe Sands (ed.), International Law, The International Court of Justice and 
Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, at 280; Olivier Corten, François 
Dubuisson, ‘L’hypothèse d’une règle émergente fondant une intervention militaire sur une ‘autorisation 
implicite’ du Conseil de sécurité’, RGDIP, t. 104, num. 4, 2000, at 71. 
(105) Roberto Ago, ‘Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility…’, supra note 25, at 69, para. 
119. 
(106) See Luigi Condorelli, ‘Les attentats du 11 septembre et leurs suites: où va le droit international?’, 
RGDIP, t. 105, 2001, at 838. 
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actions in self-defense are not only authorized to halt and/or repel an armed 
attack, but also to prevent attacks and deter attackers from launching operations 
in the future
(107)
. Emmerich De Vattel had already contended, more than two 
hundred years ago, regarding the right to security: “It is safest to prevent the evil 
when it can be prevented. A nation has a right to resist an injurious attempt, and 
to make use of force and every honourable expedient against whosoever is 
actually engaged in opposition to her, and even to anticipate his machinations 
[…]. Finally, the offended party have a right to provide for their future security, 
and to chastise the offender, by inflicting upon him a punishment capable of 
deterring him thenceforward from similar aggressions, and of intimidating those 
who might be tempted to imitate him.”
(108)
This stretching out of the self-
defense’s purpose has often been invoked in the context of the war against 
terrorism, notably because terrorist operations are so sudden and sporadic that it 
is therefore much easier to prevent or repel terrorist attacks than to halt ongoing 
ones. 
2. Rejection of far too broad a security argument 
Under the banner of self-defense some States have been using force in order 
to prevent and/or deter future attacks
(109)
. Actually, what they call self-defense 
today is nothing more than the implementation of the nineteenth century 
concept of self-help (or self-preservation, self-protection). At that time, the two 
concepts were very similar; both expressed the right for the State to ensure its 
own security. Ian Brownlie observes that “[s]elf-defence was regarded either as 
synonymous with self-preservation or as a particular instance of it.”
(110)
 
Furthermore, in the Caroline affair that began in 1837, the two notions were 
indistinctly associated
(111)
. Thus, during the nineteenth century the right of self-
defense (or self-help) could be invoked in many differing situations. Humphrey 
Waldock noted: “legitimate self-defence has three main requirements: (1) An 
actual infringement or threat of infringement of the rights of the defending 
                                      
(107) See notably Louis Henkin, ‘The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy’, in: Henkin Louis, et. al. (ed.), 
Right v. Might, International Law and the Use of Force, New York, London, Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, 1989, at 45; Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, Dordrecht, Boston, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991, at 154; Jost Delbrück, ‘The Fight Against Terrorism: Self-Defense or 
Collective Security as International Police Action? Some Comments on the International Legal 
Implications of the ‘War Against Terrorism’’, GYIL, vol. 44, 2001, at 17. 
(108) Emmerich De Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, (ed. by Joseph Chitty), Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson, 
1853, Book II, Chap. IV, para. 50 and 52. 
(109) Sometimes the right of self-defense is also invoked to rescue nationals in a foreign State without the 
consent of that State. See Eric Corthay, supra note 13, at 250 ff. 
(110) Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963, at 
43. 
(111) See Robert Y. Jennings, supra note 21, at 82 ff. 
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State; (2) A failure or inability on the part of the other State to use its own legal 
powers to stop or prevent the infringement; and (3) Acts of self-defence strictly 
confined to the object of stopping or preventing the infringement and reasonably 
proportionate to what is required for achieving this object”
(112)
. In other words, 
self-defense could be invoked for example to prevent or deter non-state actors 
from launching terrorist attacks. However, during the 1920s’ and 1930s’ the 
concept of self-defense has progressively emerged as an exception to the 
prohibition of war, first, and the prohibition of the use of force, then. 
Simultaneously, the scope of the customary law of self-defense, and notably the 
objective of self-defense, has been significantly narrowed. Linos-Alexandre 
Sicilianos, who analyzed State practice during the inter-war period, came to the 
conclusion that self-defense was perceived at that time as only a reaction, a 
reaction against an attack, an armed attack or an invasion
(113)
. Therefore, during 
the 1930s and especially at the time of the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, 
the purpose of the right to self-defense had been limited to the one of halting 
and repelling an armed attack. But has the customary law in that matter evolved 
subsequently? 
Since 1945, the use of force to prevent or repel terrorist attacks has been 
resorted to by some States, notably the United States, Israel and Iran. All have 
invoked self-defense as a justification for their action. It was, inter alia, the case 
at the time of US Operation Eldorado Canyon (1986), US airstrikes against the 
headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (1993), US raids in Sudan and 
Afghanistan (1998), Iranian strikes against the Mujahidin e-Khalq Organization 
camps in Iraq (1999), Operation Enduring Freedom (2001), and Israeli 
airstrikes against the Ain es Saheb Palestinian camp in Syria (2003)
(114)
. For 
instance, Operation Enduring Freedom was justified by the US Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations as follows: “In response to [the 9/11 
terrorist] attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right of individual and 
collective self-defence, United States armed forces have initiated actions 
designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States.”
(115)
  
It is worth noting that the international response to all those operations 
showed clear divisions between States. Disparity in the official views was 
                                      
(112) Humphrey Waldock, supra note 22, at 463-464. 
(113) Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Les réactions décentralisées à l’illicite: des contre-mesures à la légitime 
défense, Paris, LGDJ, 1990, at 297. 
(114) See Eric Corthay, supra note 13, at 241-250. 
(115) UN Doc. S/2001/946, 7 October 2001. See also the declaration of the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the 
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations 
(UN Doc. S/2001/947): “These forces have now been employed in exercise of the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defence, recognized in Article 51, following the terrorist outrage of 11 
September, to avert the continuing threat of attacks from the same source.” 
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pronounced; reactions varied from strong support to no less strong 
condemnation on that matter. Moreover, there was no warranty that those 
States’ response – i.e. their declarations, conducts, silence, etc. – had not been 
influenced by the emotional climate, the actors involved, or some consideration 
of political expediency, instead of by their opinio juris
(116)
. Therefore, because 
“it is not possible to discern in [State practice] any constant and uniform usage, 
accepted as law, with regard to [that matter]”
(117)
, in the opinion of the present 
writer, preventing or repelling an attack or an armed attack is currently not 
recognized by the international law as being part of the valid and limitative 
purposes of any action in self-defense. Consequently, Operation Trip to Atlantic 
City – i.e. the use of force by the United States to address the threat posed by 
bin Laden – could not be justified by the right of self-defense. 
Preventing terrorist acts, deterring terrorists from launching attacks, stopping 
and repelling their operations, or rescuing nationals abroad, are good examples 
of what legitimate national security interests are. Nevertheless, implementation 
of such measures cannot be justified by the right of self-defense. In law, another 
path must be found. In the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case, 
the International Court of Justice held: “Article 51 of the Charter may justify a 
use of force in self-defence only within the strict confines there laid down. It 
does not allow the use of force by a State to protect perceived security interests 
beyond these parameters. Other means are available to a concerned State, 
including, in particular, recourse to the Security Council.”
(118)
 
As already mentioned above, the raison d’être of self-defense is to repel an 
ongoing armed attack and simultaneously prevent it from succeeding. This is 
the essence of any action in self-defense
(119)
. Any other objective that could be 
pursued by a victim State – such as the desire to punish the aggressor or to 
prevent future attacks – must be considered as secondary and incidental to the 
real purpose of self-defense. Determining the exact purpose of self-defense is 
important, because the compliance of the action taken in self-defense with the 
customary
(120)
 requirements of the necessity, proportionality and immediacy – 
which are “essential conditions for the admissibility of the plea of self-defence 
in a given case”
(121)
 – is appreciated in the light of this purpose. The requirement 
                                      
(116) Regarding Operation Enduring freedom, see notably Elizabeth Nielsen, ‘State Responsibility for 
Terrorist Groups’, U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y, vol. 17, 2010-2011, at 184. 
(117) Asylum case, supra note 78, at 277. 
(118) Democratic Republic of the Congo case, supra note 17, para. 148. 
(119) See supra note 104. 
(120) Nicaragua case, supra note 14, para. 176. 
(121) Roberto Ago, ‘Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility…’, supra note 25, para. 119. 
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of necessity is described by Roberto Ago as follows: “The reason for stressing 
that action taken in self-defence must be necessary is that the State attacked […] 
must not, in the particular circumstances, have had any means of halting the 
attack other than recourse to armed force.”
(122)
 Then, Ago contended that “[t]he 
requirement of the proportionality of the action taken in self-defence […] 
concerns the relationship between that action and its purpose, namely – and this 
can never be repeated too often – that of halting and repelling the attack”.
(123)
  
3. The condition of immediacy 
The condition of immediacy is closely linked to the objective of self-defense. 
The former raises the question of when an action in self-defense can be 
launched: before, during or after an armed attack? In the context of the bin 
Laden Operation, it has been posited that the United States used military force 
in self-defense to address an “imminent threat”
(124)
; that is to say that the US 
Navy Special Forces intervened before an attack was actually launched by the 
head of Al-Qaida from the territory of Pakistan. Before assessing the 
compliance of Operation Trip to Atlantic City with the requirement of 
immediacy, it is essential to briefly outline the Obama doctrine of self-defense. 
3.1. The Obama doctrine 
The Obama Administration, as well as its predecessor, supports an expansive 
interpretation of the right of self-defense. Indeed, in the 2009 Operational Law 
Handbook, it is stated: “some States, including the United States, argue that an 
expansive interpretation of the UN Charter is more appropriate, contending that 
the customary law right of self-defense (including anticipatory self-defense) is 
an inherent right of a sovereign State that was not ‘negotiated’ away under the 
Charter”
(125)
. Same formulation is found in the 2006 Operational Law 
Handbook written under the Bush Administration
(126)
. According to the US 
Government, the roots of anticipatory self-defense were found in the 1837 
Caroline case: “Secretary Webster posited that a State need not suffer an actual 
armed attack before taking defensive action, but may engage in anticipatory 
self-defense if the circumstances leading to the use of force are ‘instantaneous, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for 
                                      
(122) Ibid., para. 120 (emphasis added). 
(123) Ibid., para. 121 (emphasis added). 
(124) See supra note 3. 
(125) International and Operational Law Department, Operational Law Handbook, The Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2009, at 4 and 5, available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2009.pdf. See also the Operational 
Law Handbook of 2007, at 4, available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-
handbook_2007.pdf. 
(126) International and Operational Law Department, Operational Law Handbook, The Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2006, p. 4, available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law0806.pdf. 
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 Then, referring to the 2002 and 2006 National Security 
Strategy, the 2009 Handbook explains that the expansion of use of force 
doctrine made by the Bush Administration from anticipatory to preemptive self-
defense was due to the necessity of facing the threat posed by “rogue States and 




The main difference between anticipatory self-defense (also called 
preventive self-defense) and preemptive self-defense is about the understanding 
of the concept of imminence. The right of anticipatory self-defense that 
originated in the Caroline case (or at least at that time) “has been predicated 
upon knowing, with a reasonable level of certainty, the time and place of an 
enemy’s forthcoming attack”
(129)
. On the contrary, preemptive self-defense can 
be invoked “even if uncertainty remains as the time and place of the enemy’s 
attack”
(130)
. Both doctrines of self-defense refer to the ‘imminence’ of the attack, 
but both of them apply two different meanings for that concept. For the former 
the attack is imminent because it is ‘immediate’, while for the latter the attack is 
imminent because it is ‘certain and inevitable’
(131)
. 
The Obama Administration does not depart from the Bush doctrine of 
preemption; on the contrary, not only has the current Administration endorsed 
the doctrine of its predecessor but it has also clarified the concept of imminence 
related to preemptive self-defense. Indeed, quoting Michael Schmitt, the 2009 
Operational Law Handbook mentions two cumulative conditions in order for 
the test of imminence to be fulfilled: “states may legally employ force in 
advance of an attack, at the point when (1) evidence shows that an aggressor has 
committed itself to an armed attack, and (2) delaying a response would hinder 
the defender’s ability to mount a meaningful defense”
(132)
. Schmitt contends that 
“the correct standard for evaluating a preemptive operation must be whether or 
not it occurred during the last possible window of opportunity in the face of an 
attack that was almost certainly going to occur”
(133)
. 
                                      
(127) Operational Law Handbook (2009), supra note 125, at 6. 
(128) Ibid., (footnotes omitted). 
(129) Operational Law Handbook (2007), supra note 125, at 7. 
(130) National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 
2006, at 18, available at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2006.pdf. 
(131) Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, para. 54: “That 
does not exclude, in the view of the Court, that a ‘peril’ appearing in the long term might be held to be 
‘imminent’ as soon as it is established, at the relevant point in time, that the realization of that peril, 
however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and inevitable.” 
(132) Operational Law Handbook (2009), supra note 125, at 7. 
(133) Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Preemptive Strategies in International Law’, Mich.J.Int'l L., vol. 24, num. 2, 
2002-2003, at 535. 
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3.2. Critics towards the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense(134) 
The merits of the right of anticipatory self-defense – i.e. preventive or 
preemptive self-defense – have been rejected by many scholars who have 
analyzed the content and scope of the customary law of self-defense just before 
the adoption of the UN Charter, and have interpreted the letter and spirit of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Moreover, the study of actual State practice 
subsequent to the adoption of the UN Charter, confirmed by the view of the 
International Court of Justice, comes also to the conclusion that to date the 
alleged right of anticipatory self-defense has no place in international law. 
Consequently, Operation Trip to Atlantic City – i.e. the use of force by the 
United States to address an imminent threat before that peril is carried out – 
cannot be justified by the customary law of self-defense enshrined in Article 51. 
3.2.1. The customary law of self-defense before the adoption of the UN 
Charter 
Many scholars asserted the existence of a customary law of preventive self-
defense, originated in the Caroline case (1837)
(135)
. As already mentioned 
above, Humphrey Waldock, for example, stated that an action in self-defense 
could be triggered in case of “threat of infringement of the rights of the 
defending State”
(136)
. We have already agreed on the fact that during the 
nineteenth century the content and scope of the right of self-defense was very 
large, allowing the launch of a military operation in order to put an end to an 
imminent threat and prevent an infringement of the rights of the targeted 
State
(137)
. However, we have also explained that during the first part of the 
twentieth century the scope of the customary law of self-defense had been 
significantly narrowed and that States had perceived self-defense only as a 
reaction to an attack and not as an action to prevent a specific conduct
(138)
. 
3.2.2. The letter and spirit of Article 51 of the UN Charter 
Moreover, Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that “[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs”. A textual interpretation of the provision 
leads to a rejection of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. Indeed, the 
wording “if an armed attack occurs” is clear and does not mean “if the threat of 
                                      
(134) For convenience purposes, in the following paragraphs the concept of anticipatory self-defense 
embraces the two concepts of preventive and preemptive self-defense. 
(135) See for instance Humphrey Waldock, supra note 22, at 498; David M. Ackerman, ‘International Law 
and the Preemptive Use of Force against Iraq’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 11 
April 2003, at 1, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21314.pdf; Thomas M. Franck, 
‘What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq’, AJIL, vol. 97, num. 3, 2003, at 619. 
(136) Humphrey Waldock, supra note 22, at 463-464 (emphasis added). 
(137) See Eric Corthay, supra note 13, at 78-81. 
(138) See Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, supra note 113, at 297. 
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an armed attack occurs”. In other words, and according to the canon expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, the condition stated in Article 51 – the existence of 
an ongoing armed attack – is the only condition required for the exercise of the 
right of self-defense
(139)
. This view is notably shared by Joseph Kunz who 
contended that the right of self-defense enshrined in Article 51 “does not exist 
against any form of aggression which does not constitute ‘armed attack’. [...] 
this term means something that has taken place. Art. 51 prohibits ‘preventive 
war’. The ‘threat of aggression’ does not justify self-defense under Art. 51. […] 
The ‘imminent’ armed attack does not suffice under Art. 51.”
(140)
  
In addition, following a purposive interpretation of the UN Charter, some 
scholars maintain that the objective of Article 51 is to enable States to resort to 
armed force once they are threatened
(141)
. We reject such a statement. As the 
right of self-defense is an exception to the fundamental principle prohibiting the 
use of force, the will of States who have drafted the UN Charter was to limit as 
much as possible the right for States to use force in their international relations, 
and not to recognize a right of self-protection that could be implemented every 
time they were threatened
(142)
. Use of force in case of threat to international 
peace and security can only be envisaged through the system of collective 
security; only the Security Council has the monopoly of the use of force in 
prevention of injurious acts
(143)
. 
3.2.3. Actual State practice 
Furthermore, subsequent State practice requires our attention. It has just been 
shown that in 1945 Article 51 of the UN Charter had received a very restrictive 
interpretation. However, it is a priori not impossible that between 1945 and 
today States have expansively interpreted Article 51 and considered that the said 
provision authorizes States to use force in anticipation of an attack. In that case, 
actual State practice would have given rise to a new customary law of self-
defense. This being said, in order for a new customary law of anticipatory self-
                                      
(139) Contra Myres S. McDougal, ‘The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense’, AJIL, vol. 57, num. 
3, 1963, at 600. 
(140) Josef L. Kunz, supra note 24, at 878. See also Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations. A 
Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems, London, Stevens, 1950, at 797. 
(141) See notably the remarks of Martti Koskenniemi in: Crimes of War Project, ‘Iraq and the ‘Bush 
Doctrine’ of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence’, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org. 
(142) Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2nd ed., 1979, at 142; Albrecht Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’, in: Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of 
the United Nations, A Commentary, vol. I, Munich, C. H. Beck, 2002, at 803. 
(143) Théodore Christakis, ‘Existe-t-il un droit de légitime défense en cas de simple ‘menace’? Une 
réponse au ‘groupe de personnalités de haut niveau’ de l’ONU’, in: Société française pour le droit 
international, Les métamorphoses de la sécurité collective. Droit, pratique et enjeux stratégiques, journée 
franco-tunisienne, Paris, Pedone, 2005, at 210, note 42. 
31
Corthay: ???? "???? ??? ???????? ????" ?? ??? ?? ?????? ?? ?????
Published by Scholarworks@UAEU, 2015
[Operation Trip to Atlantic City in Light of the Right of Self-Defense] 
 
 
                                                                                                                 [Year 29, Issue No. 63  July 2015]  54 
 
defense to emerge, actual practice of “the international community of States as a 
whole”
(144)
, – a practice that reflects their opinio juris – must have been constant 
and uniform. This is what we need to determine. 
Since 1945, some States, notably the United States and Israel, have resorted 
to the use of force in anticipation of terrorist attack. All have invoked self-
defense as a justification for their action. It was, inter alia, the case during the 
Israeli airstrikes against Palestinian camps in the North of Lebanon (1975), 
Israeli Operation Litani (1978), US Operation Eldorado Canyon (1986), and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (2001)
(145)
. The 1986 strike against Libya is a 
particularly interesting example. On April 14
th
, President Ronald Reagan 
declared: “Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose 
behind the mission undertaken tonight – a mission fully consistent with Article 
51 of the UN Charter. We believe that this preemptive action against terrorist 
installations will not only diminish Colonel Qadhafi’s capacity to export terror, 
it will provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal 
behavior.”
(146)
 Nowadays, the US military doctrine considers the operation as an 
example of anticipatory self-defense. Thus, the 2007 Operational Law 
Handbook notes: “The United States in particular, in actions such as 
OPERATION ELDORADO CANYON (the 1986 strike against Libya) and the 
1998 missile attack against certain terrorist elements in Sudan and Afghanistan, 
has increasingly employed anticipatory self-defense as the underlying rationale 




Once more, it must be stressed that the operations mentioned supra show a 
radical division between States. Few of them accepted a legal right of 
anticipatory self-defense. Many condemned the resort to force in concreto and 
qualified the military operations notably as aggressions
(148)
 or acts of 
aggression
(149)
. An instance of this is given by the Lebanese Representative to 
                                      
(144) See Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.  
(145) See Eric Corthay, supra note 13, at 241-250. 
(146) President Ronald Reagan, ‘President’s address to the nation, Apr. 14, 1986’, Dep’t St.Bull., vol. 86, 
num. 2111, 1986, at 2 (emphasis added). 
(147) Operational Law Handbook (2007), supra note 125, at 6. 
(148) The following States have qualified Operation Litani as an aggression: Lebanon, UN Doc. 
S/PV.2071, 17 March 1978, para. 12; Jordan, UN Doc. S/PV.2071, 17 March 1978, para. 77; Syria, UN 
Doc. S/PV.2071, 17 March 1978, para. 88; Egypt, UN Doc. S/PV.2072, 18 March 1978, para. 7; Kuwait, 
UN Doc. S/PV.2072, 18 March 1978, para. 34; Viet Nam, UN Doc. S/PV.2072, 18 March 1978, para. 65; 
URSS, UN Doc. S/PV.2073, 18 March 1978, para. 36. 
(149) It was notably the case during the 1975 Israeli raid against Palestinian camps in Lebanon. See Egypt, 
UN Doc. S/PV.1859, 4 December 1975, para. 113; URSS, UN Doc. S/PV.1860, 5 December 1975, para. 6; 
Cameroun, UN Doc. S/PV.1861, 8 December 1975, para. 13; China, UN Doc. S/PV.1861, 8 December 
1975, para. 37; Mauritania, UN Doc. S/PV.1861, 8 December 1975, para. 44; Belarus, UN Doc. 
32
Journal Sharia and Law, Vol. 2015, No. 63 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2015/iss63/10




55 [College of  Law UAE University]                                       
 
the Security Council which explained in 1975 why preventive measures cannot 
be admitted: “This is a dangerous course to follow in international affairs. Are 
States to be allowed to determine on their own what should be termed 
preventive acts? If so, this will lead the world back to the law of the jungle, and 
far away from the international order based on the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations.”
(150)
 More than ten years later, in the context of Operation 
Eldorado Canyon, the Representative of Qatar came to the same conclusion: “in 
international law the concept of ‘pre-emptive self-defence’ does not exist, since 
armed aggression has to precede acts of self-defence according to the first 
condition of that limited exception to the rule of non-use of force stipulated by 
Article 51 of the Charter. Otherwise, the invoking of pre-emptive self-defence 
could be the pretext of all imaginable acts of armed aggression.”
(151)
 
This brief study of State practice subsequent to the adoption of the UN 
Charter seems therefore to show that States are divided on the question whether 
the right of anticipatory self-defense has a place in international law. As the 
actual practice of the international community of States as a whole is not 
uniform, as well as not constant, the right of anticipatory self-defense does not 
exist in general international law. 
3.2.4. International jurisprudence 
The conclusions mentioned above are confirmed by judicial decisions. In the 
Nicaragua case of 1986, the International Court of Justice expressed no view on 
“the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack” because of 
the circumstance in which the dispute had arisen between the Parties
(152)
. 
However, the statements issued by the Court implicitly but clearly indicate a 
rejection of the right of anticipatory self-defense. Thus, in paragraph 176 of the 
judgment, the Court notes that the Charter “does not contain any specific rule 
whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to 
the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in 
customary international law”
(153)
. In paragraph 195, she declares: “In the case of 
individual self-defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the State 
                                                                                                   
S/PV.1862, 8 December 1975, para. 3; Iraq, UN Doc. S/PV.1862, 8 December 1975, para. 16; Tanzania, 
UN Doc. S/PV.1862, 8 December 1975, para. 38.  
(150) UN Doc. S/PV.1859, 4 December 1975, para. 99. 
(151) UN Doc. S/PV.2677, 16 April 1986, at 7. 
(152) Nicaragua case, supra note 14, para. 194. 
(153) Ibid., para. 176 (emphasis added). In French the text is more explicit: “elle ne comporte pas la règle 
spécifique – pourtant bien établie en droit international coutumier – selon laquelle la légitime défense ne 
justifierait que des mesures proportionnées à l'agression armée subie, et nécessaires pour y riposter” 
(emphasis added). 
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concerned having been the victim of an armed attack.”
(154)
 And finally in 
paragraph 232, the Court held: “The exercise of the right of collective self-
defence presupposes that an armed attack has occurred.”
(155)
 
In the Oil Platforms case, whose judgment was rendered after the invasion of 
Iraq by the United States, the International Court of Justice also implicitly 
confirmed that the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense has no place in 
international law. Indeed, in paragraph 51 the Court held: “in order to establish 
that it was legally justified in attacking the Iranian platforms in exercise of the 
right of individual self-defence, the United States has to show that attacks had 
been made upon it for which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were 
of such a nature as to be qualified as “armed attacks” within the meaning of that 
expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and as understood in 
customary law on the use of force”
(156)
. Therefore, the Court states that the 
implementation of the right of self-defense requires the existence of an armed 
attack, and not only the existence of a threat of attack; a condition not fulfilled 
in the case of Operation Trip to Atlantic City.  
Conclusion 
Operation Trip to Atlantic City could not be justified by the right of self-
defense as the conditions of invocation and implementation of that right were 
not fulfilled in casu. Indeed, self-defense can only be triggered in the case of 
ongoing armed attack by a State. However, in recent years, Pakistan – and 
neither probably other countries – has not engaged its international 
responsibility for injurious acts committed or about to be committed by Al-
Qaida from its territory, regardless of whether the country was unable or 
unwilling to prevent imminent threats or to punish previous activities. In 
addition, self-defense is justified in law only to halt and/or repel an armed attack 
and not to prevent prospective ones. This requirement of immediacy is enough 
to explain the difficulty of justifying use of force against terrorists, whose 
attacks are sudden and sporadic, by the right of self-defense. 
So, what were the other but lawful military options for the United States? 
Setting aside the idea of an intervention following an authorization delivered by 
Pakistan – the United States had considered but rejected that option – the only 
other possibility would have been to resort to the second exception to the 
principle prohibiting the use of force: the system of collective security. The 
United States could have referred the existence of an imminent threat posed by 
bin Laden to the Security Council which, after having determined the existence 
of a threat to the peace, could have decided to take measures to address, if 
                                      
(154) Ibid., para. 195 (emphasis added). 
(155) Ibid., para. 232 (emphasis added). 
(156) Oil Platforms case, supra note 14, para. 51 (emphasis added). 
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possible efficiently, that threat
(157)
. Having said that, whatever decisions the 
Security Council would have envisaged under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – 
for example, to authorize States to use all necessary measures to arrest bin 
Laden on the territory of Pakistan – it would have taken a certain time for the 
decision to be adopted and implemented, a sufficient amount of time that would 
have certainly allowed bin Laden to flee and find a safe haven far away.  
Finally, lawful or not, the use of armed force in the context of the fight 
against terrorism is often counterproductive. Conducted to halt or to prevent 
terrorist attacks, or to deter terrorists from acting, the use of armed force 
generally causes an escalation of violence and a spiral of reprisals. Armed 
violence induces more terrorism, and both of them generate innocent victims, a 
burning sense of injustice and a dangerous grudge. In order to defeat terrorism, 
the international community should strive to eliminate the conditions favorable 
for the emergence and rise of terrorism. Measures to implement could be the 
elimination of ethnic and religious discriminations, the end of foreign 
occupations, the establishment of the rule of law, the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, the promotion of tolerance and dialogue among civilizations, as well 
as education of all classes everywhere, to mention a few
(158)
. These measures 
are a huge undertaking in that they require a sustainable effort over many years, 
measures however that remain crucial and indispensable. 
                                      
(157) See Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and in particular Art. 39. 
(158) For other ideas, see notably the report of the Secretary General, Uniting against terrorism: 
recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy, UN Doc. A/60/825, 27 April 2006. 
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 يف ضوء حق الدفاع عن النفس "رحلة اىل أتالنتيك سيتي"ملخص 
 الدكتور إيريك كورثاي
 املساعد العام والعالقات الدولية أستاذ القانون الدويل
 كلية البحرين مملكة -التقنية  البحرينكلية 
 ،، عملية رسية التي ُأطِلق عليها اسم رحلة إىل اتالنتيك سيتي2011مايو  2يف 
 برر بعض املراقبني الغارة عىل النحو التايل:  ، أدت إىل وفاة أسامة بن الدن يف باكستان
للواليات املتحدة، وكانت باكستان غري  وشيكا   يدا  حيث واصل بن الدن يشكل هتد
أو غري راغبة يف منع تنظيم القاعدة من استخدام أراضيها كقاعدة لشن هجامت،  ،قادرة
مما يسمح للواليات املتحدة استخدام القوة العسكرية يف الدفاع عن النفس ضد بن الدن 
 يف األرايض اخلاضعة لسيادة باكستان. 
قا  هو تقييم اللالحية يف القانون من ملل هذا التيرير من لال الغرض من هذا امل
يف . وقرارات حمكمة العد  الدولية ،حتليل املدارس العلمية يف الفكر واملامرسة الدولية
وهو الرأي الذي أكدته املحكمة ، املستمر من قبل الدولةفقط وم املسلح حالة اهلج
 .الدولية
 حتجا  وإعام  اقحق يف الدفاع عن النفس مأن ظروف اال البحثيوضح هذا  كام
غري "أوال، بعد حتليل التبار  ؛ سببني عىل األقلتتحقق يف أحوا  اقحاجة القلوى ل
وكذلك نظرية التواطؤ يف ضوء قواعد اإلسناد للمسؤولية الدولية  "راغبة وغري قادرة
دة ال يمكن أن تعزى ، فإنه يستنتج أن أنشطة هتدد تنظيم القاععن فعل غري مرشوع دوليا  
للحق يف الدفاع عن النفس وحتليل  إىل باكستان. ثانيا، بعد حتديد الغرض القانوين
يمكن  ، أي عملية عسكرية باسم الدفاع عن النفسويمكن القو  أن متطلبات الفورية، 
عىل وجه اخللوص للتلدي ألي هجوم قد يقع و حتسبا  ، وذلك تم بلورة قانونيةتأن 
 يك.ألي هتديد وش
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